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COMMENT
The Confidentiality of University Student Records:
A Common Law Analysis
College students are subject to continuous objective and
subjective evaluations prior to and throughout their college careers. The results of many of these evaluations eventually find
their way into each student's "file." These evaluations can have
a significant impact on the student. Selection of fellowship and
scholarship recipients, enrollment in special classes, admission to
graduate school, and offers of employment are only a sampling of
the opportunities that may be contingent upon the information
maintained by the university in student files. Obviously the student, as well as the university, has a vital interest in ensuring that
the information is accurate and is disclosed only to appropriate
persons.
The interests of the student and the university with respect
to the confidentiality of, or student access to, the records maintained in the student file often conflict. The student may want
access to his file for several reasons, one of which is to obtain
feedback pertaining to his past performance and to correct any
prejudicial inaccuracies contained in the file. He may also want
to control access to his file by prospective employers, parents, and
others whose knowledge of unfavorable reports in the file may be
against his interests. In contrast, the university is limited by
adminstrative constraints in providing access to students and has
an interest in maintaining the usefulness of certain items by controlling access. For example, the university has an interest in
denying student access to letters of recommendation since such
letters would tend to be less candid-therefore less meaningful-if the authors could not be guaranteed confidentiality. Further, the university may wish to provide access to the records to
certain persons-professors, counselors, and prospective employers-against the student's wishes. These student-university conflicts are often significant enough to warrant judicial or statutory
resolution.
Although the number of student-university disputes over the
confidentiality of student records is increasing, few reported cases
directly treat this issue. Twenty years ago, an analysis of this
subject would have been largely theoretical. Since that time, a
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shift in attitudes toward recognizing student rights, the increased
availability of legal services, and important technological advances in the ability to record, store, and facilitate access to vast
quantities of data have focused national interest on the issue of
student records confidentiality.
Recent federal legislation, known as the Buckley amendment, conditions certain federal funding upon school compliance
with the student records confidentiality guidelines set forth in the
statute.' The Buckley amendment basically provides that a student be given access to his own educational records and that
1. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,20 U.S.C. 8 12328 (Supp. IV,
1974) [hereinafter cited as Buckley amendment]. The Buckley amendment, a part of the
Education Amendments of 1974, became effective November 19, 1974 and was later
amended by S.J. RES. 40, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). An in-depth analysis of the Act is
provided by Note, Federal Genesis of Comprehensive Protection of Student Educational
Record Rights: The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 61 IOWA
L. REV.
74 (1975). For its legislative history see Comment, The Buckley Amendment: Opening
School Files For Student and Parental Review, 24 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV.588, 594-99 (1975);
Comment, Protecting the Privacy of School Children and Their Families Through the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 14 J . FAMILY
L. 255, 270-76 (1975).
The statute applies only to educational institutions, public or private, receiving federal funds under programs sponsored by the Commissioner of Education. 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974). A student is defined as "any person with respect to whom
an educational agency or institution maintains education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a person who has not been in attendance at such
agency or institution." 20 U.S.C. # 1232g(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974). The only sanction for
noncompliance is withholding of funds from the offending institution.
The statute provides a student the right of access to his student records within 45
days of a request. The student also has a right to a hearing to challenge the content of his
records. A student may not, however, view the following materials:
a. the financial records of a student's parents;
b. confidential letters of recommendation entered into the record prior to the
effective date of the statute;
c. confidential letters of recommendation entered into the record subsequent
to the effective date of the statute where the student has waived his right to see
them;
d. records made by professionals, e.g., physicians and psychiatrists, while acting in their professional duties;
e. records in the sole possession of the maker that are not otherwise accessible
to other parties.
Without the student's written consent, the educational institution cannot release a
student's personal records, except for "directory information" (name, address, major,
telephone listing, etc.) to third parties other than (a) other university officials with a valid
interest; (b) officials of educational institutions where the student is applying for admission; (c) accrediting organizations; (d) any party presenting a valid court subpoena; (e)
certain government officials; and (f) parents of a dependent student. 20 U.S.C. §
1232g(b)(l),(b)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
The institution must keep a record of parties who request access to specific student
records and must publish their records policy in such a way as to give sufficient notice to
the student. 20 U.S.C. 9 1232g(b)(4)(A) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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public access to a student's educational records be denied absent
the student's permission.*The Buckley amendment leaves unresolved, however, numerous issues likely to arise in future studentuniversity litigation? Neither the causes of action available to the
student nor the defenses available to the university are defined
by the statute. The propriety of various remedies, such as compensatory and punitive damages, injunctions, and mandamus,
remains unanswered. Further, the Buckley amendment does not
affect schools that receive no funds under the specified federal
program~.~
The case law concerning student records confidentiality is
similarly undefined. The few courts that have resolved such disputes have generally either relied upon state statutes5 or have
summarily disposed of the issue without articulating a legal
basis .6
Since the statutory and case law of student records confidentiality is unsettled, a careful review of analogous common law
doctrines will be helpful. Although judicial precedents directly on
point are scant, the common law provides useful tools by which
questions of student records confidentiality can be analyzed and
resolved. The most important of these are the tort right to privacy, the "right to know," as defined by the law of public records
disclosure, and the law of contracts. An orderly judicial development of these common law doctrines would better serve the re2. Buckley amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l)(A), (b)(l) (Supp. IVY1974).
3. Although the Buckley amendment applies to elementary, secondary, and university level institutions, no attempt is made in this comment to deal with the record keeping
policies of all. Rather, it will focus on the problems of record confidentiality in the university setting, and the application of the common law in that same context.
4. The federal funds that are conditioned upon compliance with the terms of the
Buckley amendment are those received under any program administered by the Commissioner of Education. 40 Fed. Reg. 1210 (1975).
5. See, e.g., Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 187 Iowa 555,174 N.W. 334 (1919)
(a state law establishing graded schools required finding that student's grades were public
property, not the private property of teacher or superintendent); Wagner v. Redmond, 127
So. 2d 275, 277 (La. Ct. App. 1960) (en banc) (despite local school board rule, state law
required superintendent to provide certain student names and addresses to member of
board).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Knowlton, 370 F. Supp. 1119, 1123 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without
opinion, 505 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1974) (West Point cadet); Hagopian v. Knowlton, 346 F.
Supp. 29 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1972) (West Point cadet); Wasson v.
Trowbridge, 269 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967) (Merchant
Marine cadet). In each case the court summarily denied plaintiffs request to view his
school records. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 459 F.2d 1304 (D.C. Cir.'1972), reu'd, 412 U.S. 306
(1973) (official immunity and constitutional protection of congressional speech and debate
precluded suit).
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spective interests of the student and the university than would
burdensome legislative regulation. The purpose of this comment
is to assist in that development.

Prior to 1890, no English or American court had granted
relief for an invasion of the "right to privacy."' In that year, the
seminal article by Warren and Brandeis articulated for the first
time the existence of a common law "right to privacy," the invasion of which was an actionable tort? Since that time, the right
to privacy has been invoked in a number of factual setting^.^
7. Although several distinct concepts are encompassed under the rubric of privacy,
only two major meanings are involved in the context of university recordkeeping. The first
is the "right of selective disclosure," which is the "claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others." A. WESTIN, PRIVACY
AND FREEDOM
7 (1967). The second is a
broader principle, well-defined by Judge Cooley's phrase, "the right to be let alone." T.
COOLEY,
TORTS29 (2d ed. 1888). This right is the "right of personal autonomy" and is
concerned with allowing individuals the freedom to decide for themselves whether to
engage in certain acts or experiences. See Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV.
34,37-38 (1967). Confusion of these two principles arises since the same act can simultaneously involve both aspects of privacy. For example, a woman seeking an abortion may wish
neither to disclose that fact to the public nor be restricted by the law in making her
decision. In the discussion on the confidentiality of student records, the primary focus is
on the selective disclosure right. But if student records contain sensitive information
regarding such intimate matters as abortion, other matters of moral decision, or psychological reports, then the concept of personal autonomy would also become a relevant
consideration in evaluating a university's recordkeeping policies.
8. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.L. REV.193 (1890). The authors
argued for the explicit recognition of a personal right to privacy, claiming that the right
had been protected throughout the development of the common law under various legal
theories, but had never been recognized as a distinct, legally protected interest.
The article was written after an intrusion by the press into a private party given by
one of Boston's social elite, Mr. Warren himself. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.L. REV.383
(1960). Consequently, it focused upon undue publicity as a breach of privacy. Id. at 389,
392. Privacy was nevertheless defined in broad terms-the authors provided substantial
growing room for the varied application of the new tort they had categorized. Since this
influential article, a large body of private civil law, both common law and statutory, has
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS4 117 (4th ed.
developed. See generally W. PROSSER,
1971).
9. See generally Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF.L. REV.383 (1960). Dean Prosser suggests
that the law of privacy has developed in a haphazard manner, sacrificing internal coherency for expediency. He identifies four different interests that are protected by the law of
privacy: (1) intrusion upon plaintiffs seclusion, or into his private affairs; (2) public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts about plaintiff; (3) publicity that places plaintiff
in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of
HANDBOOK
OF THELAW
the plaintiffs name or likeness. Id. a t 389. See also W. PROSSER,
OF TORTS§ 117 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser's analysis has been criticized as obscuring the
deeper interests-the intrinsic values of human dignity-that should be, or are in fact,
protected by the law of privacy. See Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity:
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Those cases dealing with the public disclosure of private facts
suggest four elements that are indispensable to a cause of action: l o
(1) the information must be private; (2) the information must
have been disclosed to the public; (3) the information disclosed
must identify the injured party; and (4) the disclosure must be
offensive to reasonable sensibilities.

A.

The Information Must Be Private1'

Although the range of information kept in student files varies
widely among universities, a typical student file contains three
broad categories of information:
(1) Information requested from and furnished by the student, including biographical data, letters of inquiry written by
the student to the university, signed statements of intended compliance with university policies, and personal financial data.
(2) Information generated by the university concerning the
student, including transcripts and grade reports, current class
status, special placement or other test results, and teacher recommendations or evaluations.
(3) Information received by the university from third parties, including high school or former college transcripts, national
testing results, and letters of recommendation.
Not all of this information, in fact relatively little of that
provided by the student himself, would qualify as private under
common law precedent. The cases indicate that "private information" is that which an individual himself would not divulge to
the public.12 "Manifestly an individual cannot claim a right to
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y .U.L. REV.962, 1000-1007 (1964). Despite Bloustein's
criticism, Presser's classifications provide a helpful structural framework for analyzing
privacy interests in the area of student records confidentiality.
10. See generally W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF %E LAW OF TORTS5 117 (4th ed. 1971).
11. The terms "private" and "public" have been used to convey a number of meanings. The term "private," as it is here used, refers to the nature of the information itsklf
rather than the nature of the records upon which the information is kept. In subsequent
parts of this comment, reference is made to public records. The term "public records"
refers to records required to be kept by law and should not be confused with public
information (information that is not private). Indeed, public records, as well as nonpublic
records, can contain protected private information.
12. The effect of a person's release of information has, in the past, been to prevent
his further control.
Once an individual has given u p information about himself . . . the presumption has been that he could not exert any control over i t and had little legal
recourse in the absence of extremely abusive disclosure of information files. Now
with several recently enacted laws . . . this presumption has been overthrown.
Symms & Hawks, The Threads of Privacy: The Judicial Evolution of a "Right of Privacy"
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privacy with regard to that which cannot, from the very nature
of things and by operation of law, remain private."I3 Applying
this rule, courts have refused to classify information regarding
birth or marriage, %ome address, '"military
service, '%nd public
occupation as private.I7 A university presumably would not incur
liability for the public release of similar kinds of informationl"a
student's name, date or place of birth, year in school, major field
of study, class schedule, address, and awards received-since
such information generally is not considered private. On the other
hand, grade reports, transcripts, psychological testing results,
and similar evaluative information have been held to satisfy the
privacy requirement on grounds of public policylg or statutory
pr~hibition.~~

B. T h e Information Must Have Been Disclosed to the Public
The extent of publication, the sensitivity of the information
disseminated, and the types of persons to whom the information
and Current Legislative Trends, 11 IDAHOL. REV. 11, 21 (1974). See also Hoglund &
Kahan, Invasion of Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40
GEO.WASH.L. REV.527, 529-31 (1972); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560,
567, 255 N.E.2d 765, 769, 307 N.Y .S.2d 647, 652 (1970).
13. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304,311,95 P.2d 491,495 (1939)
(newspaper's publication of spouse's suicide was not an invasion of privacy since investigation of suicide was required by statute).
14. Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 111, 14 Cal. Rptr. 208 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1961); Meetze v. Associated Press, 203 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
15. McNutt v. New Mexico State Tribune Co., 88 N.M. 162,538 P.2d 804 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 88 N.M. 318, 540 P.2d 248 (1975).
16. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1951); Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949) (en
banc) .
17. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949) (en
banc); Reed v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 21 So. 2d 895 (La. Ct. App. 1945).
18. The Buckley amendment specifically exempts "directory information" from the
category of student information protected by the statute, including:
[Tlhe student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of birth,
major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports,
weight and height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees
and awards received, and the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(5)(A)(Supp. N,1974). Provision is made, however, for a student to
excise this material from public directories if he so desires. 20 U.S.C. 9 1232g(a)(5)(B)
(Supp. IV, 1974).
19. People v. Russel, 214 Cal. App. 2d 445,452, 29 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
20. The Buckley amendment protects "education records," which are defined as
"those records, files, documents, and other materials which-(i) contain information directly related to a student; and (ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution
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is made available must be considered to determine whether there
has been sufficient public disclosure of a student's records. Although university records policy allowing general publication of
a student's private records may violate the student's right to
privacy, there is question whether disclosure of those records to
only one or even several unauthorized persons is sufficient to
constitute "public disclosure." In a 1962 decision involving demonstrative publication by a creditor of information concerning
a debtor's alleged nonpayment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that absent physical intrusion,
the tort of invasion of privacy must be accompanied by publicity
to a "large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few."21
On the other hand, some cases suggest that certain information, although part of a public record, must nonetheless be kept
confidential and free from any unauthorized public i n ~ p e c t i o n . ~ ~
Especially if the privacy interests of the plaintiff are unusually
high, for example, where the records treat matters of morality,
discipline, or psychological evaluation, courts have taken a more
critical view of records disclosure. The courts in these cases have
suggested that the importance or sensitivity of the information
disclosed may be a decisive factor in determining whether such
disclosure is actually considered a "public d i s c l ~ s u r e . " ~ ~
or by a person acting for such agency or institution." 20 U.S.C. 5 1232g(a)(4)(A)(Supp.
IV,1974).
21. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9,11 (5th Cir. 1962) (tires
were removed from plaintiffs automobile and it was left standing on its rims a t country
club where plaintiffs fellow employees, employer, and country club members viewed this
embarrassment to plaintiff recovery allowed). Compare Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 53
Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942) (letters distributed to 1,000 persons
were sufficient publication for invasion of privacy) and Montgomery Ward v. Larragoite,
81 N.M. 383, 467 P.2d 399 (1970) (publication of debt to three relatives was invasion of
privacy) with Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295 Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943) (oral
publication in restaurant with "several persons" present was no invasion); Hendry v.
Conner, 226 N.W.2d 921 (Minn. 1975) (oral publication to a "very small number of
persons" in hospital waiting room was no invasion); French v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 247
Ore. 554, 430 P.2d 1021 (1967) (disclosure to son and daughter-in-law was not sufficient);
and Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 327 A.2d 133 (1974) (notification to one
employer and three relatives was not sufficient publication).
22. See, e.g., Mathews v. Pyle, 75 Ariz. 76, 251 P.2d 893 (1952); Patterson v. Tribune
Co., 146 So. 2d 623 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962), cert. denied, 153 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1963); State
ex rel. Cummer v. Pace, 121 Fla. 871, 164 So. 723 (1935); MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Ore. 27,
359 P.2d 413 (1961).
23. See, e.g., Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, 26 Cal. App. 2d 183, 79
P.2d 101 (Dist. Ct. App. 1938); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Trustees,
178 Mich. 193, 144 N.W. 538 (1913); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. State, 282 Minn.
86, 163 N.W.2d 46 (1968).
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Whether private student records are of a sensitive nature
sufficient to satisfy the public disclosure element is a question
that has not been fully resolved. A California appellate court
announced in 1963 that limited disclosure of private student records to even one unauthorized person was against public policy
and that the negligent release of a student's transcript to an
unauthorized third party "might well subject the school to suit
. . . for a violation of [the student's] right of privacy."24 The
court held that a fraudulent request by an unauthorized party for
a student's transcript was criminal fraud, which "injures the
public because it has been determined that the best interests
of society are served by not opening to the general public the
grades received by individual^."^^ This language suggests that
disclosure of private student records to even one unauthorized
person can be sufficient to satisfy the public disclosure element
of a tortious invasion of privacy.
Certain third parties, however, are not considered part of this
public. Disclosure of private student records to these parties does
not result in liability for invasion of privacy.26Important among
these exceptions are courts of law issuing subpoenas for student
records, since the right of privacy exists only so far as its assertion
is consistent with law or public policy, and university personnel,
who presumably have a right of access to student records for
educational or other valid purposes of the uni~ersity.~'
Absent
such valid purposes, however, university personnel should have
no greater access to a student's records than any other member
of the public. The right of access may also extend to "institutions
of learning" to which the student is applying for admission. In
1969, a federal district court held:
School officials have a right and, we think, the duty to record
and communicate true factual information about their students
to institutions of learning, for the purposes of giving to the latter
24. People v. Russel, 214 Cal. App. 2d 445,452, 29 Cal. Rptr. 562, 567 (Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
25. Id.
26. The Buckley amendment makes provision for the release of student records,
without consent, to the following parties: (a) university officials with a valid interest; (b)
officials of educational institutions where the student is applying for admission; (c) certain
government officials; (d) accrediting organizations; (e) any party pursuant to presentation
of a valid court order. 20 U.S.C. 06 1232g(b)(l)(A)-(I),(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV, 1974).
27. See generally Caruso, Privacy of Students and Confidentiality of Student
Records, 22 CASEW . RES. L. REV.379 (1971). See also Growick v. Board of Ed., 39 App.
Div. 2d 785, 331 N.Y.S.2d 906 (3d Dep't 1972) (school principal required t o furnish confidential student records for pretrial examination).
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an accurate and complete picture of the applicants for admission .2x

Thus, certain information can be disclosed to authorized persons
for valid purposes without being considered "disclosed to the
public. "

C. T h e Information Disclosed Must Identify the Injured Party
The public disclosure of private information from a student
file is not an invasion of the student's right to privacy unless it
identifies the student.2gThus, the release of anonymous student
data or statistics to institutions or to individuals for research
purposes is appropriate." A university should not assume, however, that merely blotting out a student's name will be sufficient
the Supreme
to prevent identification. In Cason v.
Court of Florida held that an author who had commented in his
book about the coarse speech and brusque manner of the plaintiff, naming her only by her first name, had nonetheless made her
recognizable to her friends, and was therefore liable for invading
her privacy. Similarly, the release of student records that include
the student's photograph, social security number, address, student number, or any other information that identifies the student
could constitute an invasion of privacy by a university.
28. Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1969). Some high school
students had participated in the distribution of literature and had worn black armbands
to the graduation service as a means of protest. Plaintiff students sought to enjoin the
school from noting these activities on the school records and communicating them to
institutions of higher learning. The injunction was not granted since the petitioners failed
to show immediate or irreparable harm and the communication was true.
29. Cf. Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd,
232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956) (televising life story of criminal
12 years after a pardon, where person was not named and honest effort to avoid possible
identification was made, did not constitute an invasion of right to privacy); Raynor v.
American Broadcasting Co., 222 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
30. The Buckley amendment allows student records to be used for audit, evaluation,
or enforcement of federally supported educational programs provided the data are collected in a manner that will not allow personal identification of the students. 20 U.S.C.
l232g(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1974).
31. 155 Fla. 108, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944). See also Nappier v. Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co., 322 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1963) (television broadcast which sufficiently identified
rape victims, although not mentioning them by name, invaded their right to privacy);
Carlisle v. Fawcett Publ. Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962)
(plaintiffs given name and general description sufficiently identified plaintiff to invade
his privacy).
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T h e Disclosure Must Be Offensive to Reasonable
Sensibilities

The fourth element of a tortious invasion of privacy requires
that the public disclosure of the private student information be
Although no case has deoffensive to reasonable ~ensibilities.~~
fined what kinds of school information, if released, will satisfy
this requirement, a New York state district court held in 1971
that the act of a public school or its employees in divulging "information given to [the] school in confidence" by the pupil could
constitute outrageous actionable
The court did not,
however, discuss the nature of the information disclosed.
Obviously, situations may arise in which it would be convenient for the student-or even to his advantage-for a university
to disclose certain information in his record. The common law
right to privacy does not handcuff the university to a rigid rule
of nondisclosure in such situations. Rather, it requires that the
university use reasonable discretion to disclose only information
not offensive to reasonable sensibilities. A university may, for
instance, wish to publish the academic achievement of its honor
students. Since reasonable sensibilities are not offended by recognition of praiseworthy achievement, such disclosure is permissible.

The common law right to privacy protects a student's private
32. In Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954), plaintiff
argued that his right to privacy had been invaded by defendant's publication of a photograph showing plaintiff attempting to dissuade a woman from jumping off a bridge. The
court stated:
An invasion of the right of privacy occurs not with the mere publication of
a photograph, but occurs when a photograph is published where the publisher
should have known that its publication would offend the sensibilities of a normal
person, and whether there has been such an offensive invasion of privacy is to
some extent a question of law.
Id. a t 328 (citations omitted). See also Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App.
708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). There, defendant sent plaintiff a telegram which said, "Must
have March payment immediately or legal action." The court held:
[Tlhe right of privacy must be restricted to "ordinary sensibilities" and not to
super sensitiveness . . . . There are some shocks, inconveniences and annoyancies [sic] which members of society in the nature of things must absorb without
the right of redress.
Id. a t 711, 57 S.E.2d a t 227 (citations omitted).
33. Blair v. Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 254, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222,
228 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1971); cf. Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 48 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
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records from unauthorized disclosure. It does not, however, provide the student with the equally important right to examine his
own records and, if necessary, to correct any errors contained
there. Such a right was fashioned by the New York courts from
the common law doctrine of "the right to know."34
The right to know doctrine was originally formulated in England to open public records to the perusal of the interested public." In 1912, the Court of Appeals of New York invoked the
doctrine as authority for compelling a local water supply board
to open its records to a plaintiff citizen.36The court stated:
We think it may safely be said that a t common law, when not
detrimental to the public interest, the right to inspect public
records and public documents exists with all persons who have
a sufficient interest in the subject-matter thereof to answer the
requirements of the law governing that question.37

In 1961, the right to know doctrine was extended to student
~
New York
records. In Johnson v. Board of E d u ~ a t i o n a, ~lower
court issued a writ of mandamus compelling defendant school
board to make the school records of plaintiffs minor daughter
available to plaintiff for his inspection. Faced with similar facts,
,~~
that
another New York court, in Van Allen u. M ~ C l e a r yimplied
upon reaching majority the student himself assumes the same
rights of access that the Johnson case recognized in the parents
of the minor student. The court stated:
Although certain records of the kind here involved are privileged
and confidential, such privilege merely prevents disclosure of
the communication or record to third parties, i.e., to persons
other than . . . the person making the record. The "client" or
34. For a general review of the common law development in the area of student
K. MORAN,& F. VANDERPOOL,
LEGALASPECTS
OF STUDENT
RECORDS
records see H. BUTLER,
20-32 (1972); Carey, Students, Parents and the School Record Prison: A Legal Strategy
for Preventing Abuse, 3 J.L. & EDUC.365 (1974); Comment, Parental Right to Inspect
School Records, 20 BUFF.L. REV.255 (1970).
35. See Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-36, 32 AM. R. 219, 220-22 (Sup. Ct.
1879). The court reviewed English common law cases treating the confidentiality of public
records.
36. Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912).
37. Id. a t 154, 98 N.E. a t 469, quoting Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290,315,63 A. 146,
153 (1906).
38. 31 Misc. 2d 810, 220 N.Y.S.2d 362 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1961). Defendant
school board argued that (1) the records requested were confidential; (2) since the records
were allegedly needed to assist in the preparation of a legal action, plaintiff could obtain
them through the more accepted method of a subpoena duces tecum; and (3) the parents
requesting the records were not a party in interest.
39. 27 Misc. 2d 81, 211 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
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"patient" within the meaning of the provisions referred to is the
child and, since the child is minor, and cannot exercise full legal
discretion, [it is] the parent or guardian of the child. . . . It
should be noted, further, that the education interest of the pupil
can best be served only by full cooperation between the school
and the parents, based on a complete understanding of all available information by the parent as well as the school.40

As adopted by the New York courts, the right to know doctrine provides the student in a public school with a common law
right to examine his school records." Where it exists, however, the
right is not without reasonable boundaries-it is not available
~~
where access would be "detrimental to the public i n t e r e ~ t . "For
example, disclosure to the student of letters of recommendation
written in confidence by third parties may discourage the candor
that is necessary to make such letters useful in the university's
admission process. Since the resulting loss in the value of these
letters may be detrimental to the public interest, student access
to them arguably should be disa110wed.~~

It is generally held that a contract arises between a student
and a university when the student pays the requisite tuition and
fees and'agrees, sometimes explicitly but more often implicitly,
to conform to the school's standards of conduct and performIn" return, the school promises to provide a package of
an~e.~
40. Id. a t 86-87, 211 N.Y.S.2d a t 507-08 (citations omitted). The court continued:
"[Albsent constitutional, legislative, or administrative permission or prohibition, a parent is entitled to inspect the records of his child maintained by the school authorities as
required by law." Id. a t 93, 211 N.Y.S.2d a t 514.
41. As of yet, no case has extended the right to students a t private schools.
42. Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 315, 63 A. 146, 153 (1906) (plaintiff was entitled
to inspect state auditor's vouchers); accord, Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147,
154, 98 N.E. 467, 469 (1912).
43. The original version of the Buckley amendment included an unqualified student
right to examine any letters of recommendation in his student file. Strong objections from
universities, however, resulted in subsequent legislation that limited this right by forbidding a student to view letters of recommendation submitted prior to January 1, 1975. See
20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(l) (Supp. IV, 1974). The educators argued that without an assurance
of confidentiality, the writers of letters of recommendation would be less objective, thus
destroying the value to the university of that important input. See generally Comment,
The Buckley Amendment: Opening School Files for Student and Parental Review, 24
CATHOLIC
U.L. REV.588, 596-600 (1975) (discussion of revision).
Under the present provisions of the Buckley amendment, a student may waive his
right to view the confidential letters of recommendation added to his file after January 1,
1975. 20 U.S.C. 8 1232g(a)(l)(C) (Supp. IV, 1974).
44. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); University of
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services to the student, including instruction and certification of
attendance and performance.
The application of contract law to the student-university relationship grew out of its recognition as an alternative to the in
loco parentis do~trine.'~
Although recent recognition and creation
of constitutional, common law, and statutory rights of students
has narrowed the subject matter that can be controlled by contract, contract law still governs a sizable portion of the litigation
involving student-university disputes, especially where the university is private." The courts have shown no hesitancy in enforcMiami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Anthony v. Syracuse
Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928); Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d
374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1971).
45. Before 1960, the great majority of student challenges in state courts to the authority of educational institutions were decided in favor of the institutions. Common rationales upon which the courts based their holdings were that a student challenging a university's action is under a heavy burden to show that the action was not taken to safeguard
ideals of "scholarship and moral atmosphere," Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App. Div.
487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928), or that in the absence of a statute, a school board is
free to make policy or to take action without interference from judicial supervision as long
as its policies and actions were reasonable and nonarbitrary, Tanton v. McKenney, 226
Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
Both of these rationales, as well as others used, were buttressed by the English
common law doctrine of in loco parentis. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla.
510, 102 So. 637 (1924). Under this doctrine, the same dominion exercised over the child
by the parent was granted t o the educator. Since responsibility to educate one's children
rested upon the parent, the in loco parentis doctrine extended that responsibility, with
its concomitant rights, to the teacher. As early as 1860, however, the English courts began
to modify this doctrine. In Regina v. Hopley, 2 F. & F. 202,206, 175 Engl. Rep. 1024, 1026
(Home Cir. 1860), the court held that a defendant school teacher had inflicted "excessive"
punishment upon a student and was therefore liable for the injuries incurred by the
student.
In the United States, the doctrine was unequivocally applied to the private college
campus in Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379, 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913):
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral
welfare, and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why to that
end they may not make any rule or regulation for the government, or betterment
of their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or
regulations are wise, or their aims worthy, is a matter left solely to the discretion
of the authorities, or parents as the case may be, and in the exercise of that
discretion, the courts are not disposed to interfere, unless the rules and aims are
unlawful, or against public policy.
Since the Gott decision in 1913, however, the in loco parentis doctrine has all but been
abandoned in public college cases, see Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d
150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961), and is now facing similar extinction in
its application to cases involving private colleges, see Comment, Common Law Rights for
Private Uniuersity Students: Beyond the State Action Principle, 84 YALEL.J. 120, 141-43
(1974); Comment, Colleges and Universities: The Demise of In Loco Parentis, 6 LAND&
WATERL. REV.715 (1971).
46. Contract law has been applied more often in disputes between students and
private schools than in disputes between public schools and their students since many
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ing both express and implied terms of student-university contract~.~
Consequently,
'
an application of contract law can provide
a useful tool for the resolution of student-university disputes over
the confidentiality of student records.

A. Express Contractual Terms
The express terms of a student-university contract are typically derived from the school's catalog or bulletin." Courts have
also found contractual terms in less obvious sources, such as a
registration card,4gan admission application form," a catalog
~upplement,~'
and even from oral statements of university personnel .52
In order to legally bind both the university and the student,
however, the contractual terms must be mutually understood by
the parties.J3 Thus, the prominence and location of an express
term may determine whether it is construed as part of the
student-university contract. The relative importance of a particular matter to the parties determines the extent of prominence
required. If the term applies to a minor matter, such as library
policies, it will not be construed as part of the student-university
contract unless the term's context clearly indicates that it was
meant to be included. On the other hand, if a term concerns a
matter that is important to the student, such as the payment of
tuition and fees, a less obvious disclosure may be s u f f i ~ i e n t . ~ ~
student-public school disputes can be resolved by application of statutory provisions,
whereas state statutes do not often apply to private schools. For a discussion of state
statutes dealing with student records confidentiality see H. BUTLER,K. MORAN,& F.
VANDERPOOL,
LEGAL
ASPECTSOF STUDENT
RECORDS
16-21 (1972).
47. See cases cited note 44 supra.
48. University of Miami v. Militana, 184 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
49. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 244 App. Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (4th Dep't 1928).
50. Culver Military Academy v. Staley, 250 Ill. App. 531 (1928).
51. Balogun v. Cornell Univ., 70 Misc. 2d 474, 333 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sup. Ct. Madison
County 1971).
52. Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady
County 1971).
9 152 (1963). Mutuality of
53. See generally 1 A. CORBIN,CORBINON CONTRACTS
obligation in the context of student-university contracts does not always require mutual
promises by both parties as long as consideration is otherwise present. For example, the
student's tuition payment may provide such consideration.
54. See Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T.
1969). Plaintiff applied for admission to defendant university and made a $200 deposit;
the university's letter of acceptance provided for refund pursuant to a student's withdrawal only in case of serious illness. When plaintiff resigned to attend another institution,
the contract was held binding and plaintiff was not allowed to recover $910 of tuition and
fees paid prior to resignation.
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Since the confidentiality of his records is generally not of vital
importance to the incoming student, prominent disclosure should
be necessary to contractually bind the university and the student.
Certainly, reasonably prominent disclosure in the university catalog, class schedule, and admission application form would be
adequate .55
Once the terms of an express student-university contract are
discovered, they must be interpreted. Generally, orthodox rules
of contract interpretation apply. But when ambiguities have appeared in student-university contracts, courts have departed
from the traditional rule of construing ambiguous terms against
the drafter of the contracts6and have interpreted them in favor
In Carr v. St. John's U n i v e r ~ i t yfor
, ~ ~example,
of the univer~ity.~'
several students who had been dismissed from a private university for having witnessed or participated in a civil marriage
brought an action against the university for reinstatement. The
university defended on grounds of a university regulation which
stated that, "in conformity with ideals of Christian education and
conduct," the university reserved the right to dismiss a student
a t any time on whatever grounds the university judged advisable.
The trial court held against the university on the ground that the
regulation was too vague.5gThe appellate court recognized the
existence of a student-university contract providing that if the
student complies with the conditions set by the university, he will
be awarded a degree. Then, after stating that the university cannot arbitrarily expel or refuse a degree to a student, the court
reversed, refusing to review the university's exercise of its discretion?
55. See, e.g., cases cited notes 48, 50, 51 supra.
CORBINON CONTRACTS
$ 559 (1960).
56. See 3 A. CORBIN,
57. The question of interpretation often arises when a student challenges the university's conduct rules, which are usually written in either very general language or not
written a t all. Faced with the university's unilateral interpretation of its own rules, courts
have deferred to the university's judgment, placing the burden on the student to prove
that the university's interpretation was unreasonable or arbitrary. See, e.g., Dehaan v.
Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957); Hood v. Tabor Academy, 296 Mass.
509, 6 N.E.2d 818 (1937); Note, Contract Law and the Student-University Relationship,
48 IND. L.J. 253, 255-60 (1972).
58. 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962), rev'd, 17 App.
Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y.S.2d 410 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y .2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18, 235
N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
59. 34 Misc. 2d 319, 231 N.Y.S.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962).
60. 17 App. Div. 2d 632, 231 N.Y .S.2d 410 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 12 N.Y .2d 802,
187 N.E.2d 18, 235 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1962).
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B. Implied Contractual T e r m s
Contracting parties often implicitly agree to matters not express on the face of the written contract. If a court can ascertain
the intent of the parties with respect to such implicit terms from
the writing and any circumstances surrounding the agreement, it
will imply them as part of the contract." Absent an express statement of university policy, courts have not hesitated to imply such
terms to the student-university contracta or to limit the contract
to terms that were, or appeared to have been, mutually understood by the parties.63
The interpretation of student-university contracts could be
benefited by an analogy to the interpretation of commercial contracts. To ascertain implied terms in commercial contracts,
courts often look beyond the written agreement to the context
within which the contract was made-custom, trade usage, and
other standard practice^.^^ The governing standard, of course, is
to reflect the supposed intent manifested by the parties when the
contract was formed. Similarly, courts could interpret studentuniversity contracts in light of standard practice. If universities
sufficiently conform to a standard practice regarding the confidentiality of student records, courts may be persuaded that, although not express, the student and university implicitly agreed
on a records policy. If this theory of contract interpretation is
accepted in the student-university context, whatever develops as
the "standard practice" will have a significant impact on all universities not having an express contractual policy. Two important
influences on the development of a standard university practice
are the Buckley amendment and the Constitution.
The Buckley amendment imposes standard student records
requirements on schools that receive certain federal fundingF
Once these requirements become widely implemented, their influence on universities not covered by the Buckley amendment
-

-

61. E.g., Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 75 U S . (8 Wall.) 276 (1868).
62. John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Healy v. Larsson,
67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1971); Barker v. Bryn
Mawr College Trustees, 1 Pa. D. & C. 383 (Dist. Ct. 1922).
63. Cf. Healy v. Larsson, 67 Misc. 2d 374, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady
County 1971); Drucker v. New York Univ., 59 Misc. 2d 789, 300 N.Y.S.2d 749 (App. T.
1969).
64. See, e.g., Ransome Concrete Machinery Co. v. Moody, 282 F. 29, 36 (2nd Cir.
1922); Mortgage Corp. v. Manhattan Sav. Bank, 71 N.J. Super. 489, 497, 177 A.2d 326,
331 (Super. Ct. 1962); Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int'l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp.
116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
65. See note 1 supra.
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could be significant if imposed through the standard practice rule
of contract interpretation. On the other hand, it is possible that
the use of these requirements will not become sufficiently well
known, especially among incoming college students, to be imposed on parties by implication.
Future constitutional requirements on universities in their
relationships with students could similarly have a broad impact
on student records procedure^.^^ Although constitutional pro66. An important, but as yet unanswered question is the extent of constitutional
protection in the area of student records confidentiality. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized that the unique setting of the academic community requires appropriately tailored applications of the Constitution. But the Court has only ruled on the
more pressing campus issues including free speech, due process, and nondiscriminatory
admission, without addressing the question of a student's constitutional right to privacy.
See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND.L. REV.1027 (1969).
Even outside the university setting, the right of privacy has not been adequately
defined by the Court. See, e.g., Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH.
L. REV.219 (1965); Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional Right
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 546 (1971). The Court's hesitation in this area is a
of Privacy, 26 RECORD
reflection of the enormity of the task-privacy, like freedom, is not a unified, selfcontained concept easy of definition. For example, the right of selective disclosure and the
right of personal autonomy are both protected by the right to privacy. See note 8 supra.
The Court has been faulted for discussing the issue of privacy without appropriately
discriminating between these two distinct concepts. See Comment, Roe and Paris: Does
Privacy Have a Principle?, 26 STAN.L. REV.1161, 1163-66 (1974).
Although there were no significant privacy decisions in the Court's first century, the
nonjudicial writings of the early justices provide evidence that the right to privacy, albeit
under different appellations, was accepted as an integral aspect of individual dealings;
both the right of selective disclosure and the right of personal autonomy appear to be
subsumed in the justices' statements that the guarantees of the various constitutional
amendments were intended to secure to the individual the rights of "private sentiment,
COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTIprivate judgment, personal liberty and security." J. STORY,
TUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES
2 (2d ed. 1851). Although such thinking implied that these
privacy rights were of constitutional dimensions, invariably a breach of privacy interest
was remedied by a common law action or, less frequently, by statute. There were no
attempts to bring an action on constitutional grounds until Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), in the late 19th century. In Boyd, the Supreme Court considered for the
first time an action based on a claimed governmental breach of the constitutional right
to privacy and struck down as unconstitutional a customs statute that required a person
whose goods had been seized as contraband to either produce his business papers in court
or forfeit the goods. Justice Bradley, writing for the majority, explained that the "privacies
of life" included not only freedom from physical intrusions, but also "indefeasible
right[s] of personal security, personal liberty, and private property." Id. a t 630.
Boyd and succeeding decisions on privacy focused primarily on safeguarding an individual's right of selective disclosure, although the underlying rationale of those cases was
the protection of one's property interests, not one's personality. As a result, the right to
individual autonomy received little judicial consideration. Until 1965, judicial
interpretation alternately expanded and contracted the boundaries of the right to privacy
without formulating any rational structure for its classification.
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court assembled sufficient "emanations" from certain constitutional amendments to provide both a broad
foundation and a name for a newly expanded constitutional right to privacy. The Connect-
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hibitions apply only where "state action" is involved," such
prohibitions could, if they become widely adopted and
known, be implied into student-university contracts in the
private university sectorm irrespective of the state action reicut criminal statute a t issue prohibited the use of contraceptives. By specifically discussing the statute's application to married couples, the Court, by implication, necessarily
coupled the right of personal autonomy with the right of selective disclosure and determined that both rights were constitutionally protected.
The autonomy interest was explicitly expanded following Griswold. While elevating
a woman's abortion decision to the status of a fundamental privacy right, the Court in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), clearly showed its determination to broaden the relationships and activities that are constitutionally protected. In the process, the penumbral
theory of Griswold was replaced by the more expansive "concept of personal liberty." 410
U.S. a t 153-54. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), the Court reconfirmed this extended view of privacy protection by stating that where sufficiently intimate
relationships exist, the "protected privacy extends to the doctor's office, the hospital, the
hotel room, or as otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved. " Id. a t
66 n.13 (emphasis added).
Through the Griswold, Roe, Paris Theatre line of cases, the Supreme Court has begun
to clarify which autonomy interests and relationships mandate constitutional scrutiny. At
the same time, however, the Court has declined several opportunities to confront recent
threats to selective disclosure, especially those arising outside the context of direct law
enforcement. In State ex rel. Tarver v. Smith, 78 Wash. 2d 152, 470 P.2d 172 (1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 1000 (1971), the Court denied certiorari to a welfare recipient who attempted to challenge allegedly derogatory material that a caseworker had placed in her
welfare file. In Laird v. Tatum, 408 U S . 1 (1972), plaintiffs who attempted to challenge
the Army's general surveillance system were denied a hearing on the merits since none of
the plaintiffs could demonstrate a sufficiently direct injury or threat of injury from the
surveillance. California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974), involved the requirements of the 1970 Bank Secrecy Act that banking institutions maintain and disclose
certain financial transactions of their depositors. The Court held that the maintenance
provisions, as applied, were constitutional, but that any claims by depositors regarding
disclosure of personal records were premature, speculative, and could not be asserted
vicariously by the banking association.
The Supreme Court's lack of an unequivocal constitutional standard should not justify a university's neglect to formulate a constitutionally acceptable policy of student
records confidentiality. The Griswold, Roe, Paris Theatre development implies that a
court's jurisdiction probably would be triggered by any university records practice that
failed to protect adequately those personal autonomy areas deemed fundamental rights
by the Supreme Court. For example, if a student's records contained information regarding a student's sexual behavior, use of birth control methods, or abortions, these records
would have to be carefully safeguarded. If not, that student's constitutional right to
privacy would arguably be violated.
67. Any application of constitutional rights to students a t private universities would
require an extension of the "state action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Black, Forward: "State Action, " Equal Protection and California's Proposition 14, 81
HARV.L. REV.69 passim (1967). To date, actions of universities that are neither funded
nor operated by a state have been held not to be "state actions." Wahba v. New York
Univ., 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1974); Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp.
THEDARTMOUTH
COLLEGE
CASEAND THE PUBLIC535 (S .D .N.Y. 1968). See also H. FRIENDLY,
PENUMBRA
(1971).
PRIVATE
68. See generally Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HAW. L. REV.
1045, 1143-48 (1968).
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quirement? Thus, like the standards imposed on universities by
the Buckley amendment, constitutional prohibitions could be
implied into student-university contracts to reflect the apparent,
but unarticulated, intent of the parties with respect to student
records confidentiality.

C. Duration of the Student-University Contract
The student-university contract arises and becomes binding
a t the time the student pays his tuition.'O Consequently, contract
law provides no cause of action for any disclosure of records pertaining to a nonmatriculated student .71 The contract terminates
at the end of the student's relationship with the university. This
termination is not necessarily a t the end of a semester or term for
which the student has matriculated. Rather, student-university
contracts have been construed to include an implied option to
renew as long as reasonable conditions for renewal have been met
by the student-at least until the student terminates his course
of
Whether or not a contractual responsibility to keep
69. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
See also Wright, The Constitution on Campus, 22 VAND.L. REV.1027 (1969). Professor
Wright suggests that constitutional standards of conduct could be applied to all colleges
and universities, whether or not they come within the state action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
Historically private colleges and universities have allowed more freedom to their
students than has been true a t public institutions, and, in the turbulent
atmosphere on today's campuses, it seems to me unthinkable that the faculty
and administration of any private institution would consider recognizing fewer
rights in their students than the minimum the Constitution exacts of the state
universities . . . .
Id. a t 1035-36; cf. McKay, The Student as Private Citizen, 45 DENVER
L.J. 558 (1968).
70. Silver v. Queens College of City Univ., 63 Misc. 2d 186,311 N .Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y .C.
Civ. Ct. Queens County 1970). Plaintiff student sued to recover an alleged overcharge of
tuition. The defendant had raised the tuition rate after registration and had charged
plaintiff the difference. The court held for the student and granted the refund.
The parties to the contract are, of course, the student and the institution. If the
student is minor and dependent, then his parents may be considered parties to the contract. See, e.g., Jones v. Vassar College, 59 Misc. 2d 296, 299 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1969); cf. Eden v. Board of Trustees of State Univ., 374 N.Y.S.2d 686
(2d Dep't 1975) (contract arises when letter of acceptance is received by student).
71. The Buckley amendment protects "student" records, and defines "student" as:
[Alny person with respect to whom an educational . . . institution maintains
education records or personally identifiable information, but does not include a
person who has not been in attendance a t such . . . institution.
20 U.S.C. 8 1232g(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
72. Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909).
Solely because they were Black, plaintiffs were not allowed to register for their second year
after satisfactorily completing their first year. The court held against the college and
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student records confidential is imposed on a university even after
the student graduates is not clear. Arguably, since student records continue to remain a sensitive matter after graduation,
courts should imply the contractual term to extend as long as the
student lives.

D. Contractual Waiver of University Liability
Faced with potential liability for misuse of its students' records, a university may look to a contractual waiver for protection. While a carefully drawn waiver may diminish a university's
liability, several important legal theories may limit the effectiveness of such a waiver.
Consent has historically been a defense to most torts.73Nevertheless, a contractual waiver of tortious liability will be held
invalid if the waiver is found to be uncon~cionable.~~
Courts have
held commercial contracts containing waivers of tort liability
unenforceable where the waiver is against public policy and
where a large disparity in bargaining power exists between the
parties to a contract.75In the student-university context, however, the courts have been hesitant to limit a university's power
to contract with the student on any terms agreed upon, however
unreasonable :
There is nothing inherently illegal in the setting.by a private,
or even a public, institution of higher learning of conditions
upon which it will accept a candidate for a degree. Even if the
stipulation made as a condition is regarded as unreasonable or
oppressive, the contract made by the parties must govern in the
absence of fraud or mistake.76

A second limitation on the validity of a contractual waiver
of liability is imposed if it purports to legitimize a violation of a
reinstated the students on the ground that there was an implied understanding that the
students would not be arbitrarily dismissed before receiving their diplomas.
73. See Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N.E.2d 306 (1949);
HANDJohnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953); W. PROSSER,
BOOK OF THE LAWOF TORTS817 (4th ed. 1971).
74. See, e.g., Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 21 Conn.
WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS
§§
Supp. 38, 143 A.2d 466 (Super. Ct. 1958); 15 S. WILLISTON,
1750, 1750A (3d ed. 1972).
75. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
76. Auser v. Cornell Univ., 71 Misc. 2d 1084, 1089, 337 N.Y.S.2d 878, 883 (Sup. Ct.
Tompkins County 1972). A transfer student from a state university to a private university
was assessed, pursuant to the terms of a student university contract, a special transfer
fee. The court admitted serious difficulty in understanding the purpose of the transfer
charge but found, nonetheless, that the contract was valid and binding.
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student's constitutional rights. Some commentators have argued
that a student's constitutional rights are personal rights and, as
such, may be voluntarily waived by the student.77Others vigorously disagree.78In Dixon u. Alabama State Board of E d u ~ a t i o n , ~ ~
students had been expelled from Alabama State College for alleged misconduct. When the expulsion was challenged for a denial of the students' due process rights, the college argued that
the students had contractually waived their due process rights
upon admission. The court found that even if the alleged contractual waiver had been properly understood by the students, it was
ineffective-they could not forfeit their fundamental rights:
We do not read this [Board of Education] provision to clearly
indicate an intent on the part of the student to waive notice and
a hearing before expulsion. If, however, we should so assume, it
nonetheless remains true that the State cannot condition the
granting of even a privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process.80

Thus, it appears that a student cannot waive whatever constitutional right to privacy he may have with respect to student record~.~'
The contract doctrine that promises are unenforceable absent consideration imposes another restriction on the use by universities of contractual waivers. Since a contractual consent or
waiver given gratuitously is not enforceable," it becomes important to determine whether or not the promise was supported by
consideration. If a waiver is signed or a records policy is published
after the payment of tuition, the waiver's efficacy is questionable.83On the other hand, consent obtained for consideration is
usually e n f ~ r c e a b l e . ~ ~
Contractual waivers, then, can effectively limit a university's liability for improper use of student records to the extent
77. See Caruso, Privacy of Students and Confidentiality of Student Records, 22 CASE
W. RES.L. REV.379, 380-81 (1971).
78. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.L. REV.1045,1136L. REV.1595 (1960).
37 (1968). See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV.
79. 294 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
80. 294 F.2d a t 156.
81. See note 66 supra.
82. Garden v. Parfumerie Rigaud, Inc., 151 Misc. 692, 271 N.Y.S. 187 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1933).
83. See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV.L. REV.1045, 1137
( 1968).
84. Lillie v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 724, 34 P.2d 835 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1934).
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that they are not unconscionable or against public policy, do not
attempt to waive a constitutional right, and are supported by
consideration.

Despite the Buckley amendment's protections for student
records, substantial areas of probable dispute remain. A reasoned
application of the common law remains a flexible and sure vehicle
for the resolution of these disputes. By rational invocation of
analogy and precedent, the common law principles of tort, the
"right to know," and contract can provide extensive protection
for and an adequate balancing of both student and university
interests.

